The 1997 devolution referendums in Scotland and Wales by Duclos, Nathalie
 
Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique
French Journal of British Studies 
XIV-1 | 2006
La dévolution des pouvoirs à l'Écosse et au Pays de
Galles 1966-1999
The 1997 devolution referendums in Scotland and
Wales







CRECIB - Centre de recherche et d'études en civilisation britannique
Printed version
Date of publication: 2 January 2006





Nathalie Duclos, « The 1997 devolution referendums in Scotland and Wales », Revue Française de
Civilisation Britannique [Online], XIV-1 | 2006, Online since 15 October 2016, connection on 19 April
2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/rfcb/1187  ; DOI : 10.4000/rfcb.1187 
Revue française de civilisation britannique est mis à disposition selon les termes de la licence Creative




The 1997 devolution referendums in 








Until recently, in Britain, referendums were seen as undermining the key 
constitutional principle of Parliament’s supremacy and undivided sovereignty. The 
first referendum held on British soil was only organised in 1973 and the first and 
only British-wide referendum was held in 1975. While referendums are no longer 
considered as alien to the British system of government, they remain exceptional 
and are almost always concerned with changes in the status of he British nations 
and regions, as table 1 shows. Why are such constitutional changes now ratified by 
referendum? It seems that to British governments (or rather British Labour 
governments, as only the first referendum was organised by a Conservative 
government), the referendum is not so much a constitutional device as a political 
expedient. In the British Parliament, a Bill concerning proposals for one of the 
nations or regions which make up the UK is very likely to be rejected by MPs from 
the rest of the country wanting to safeguard their own interes s and careful not to 
shift the balance of powers unfavourably. Referendums are therefore a way of 
legitimising and of strengthening governments’ proposals, even in a context when 
the majority of the UK disagrees. This was one of the reasons given by the first Blair 
government for organising two referendums, a few months af er Labour was elected 
in 1997, as promised in the party’s electoral manifesto. The first was held in 
Scotland on 11 September 1997 and the second in Wales on 18 Septemb r 1997. 
 
The existing literature on the 1997 Scottish and Welsh referendums has largely 
focused on each referendum separately,1 but has more rarely sought to compare the 
two,2 although they are obviously linked. This article seeks to compare the projects 
on offer, the referendum campaigns and the referendum results in Scotland and 
Wales. 
 
The referendum announcement: the spectre of 1979 
 
The 1997 referendums concerned Labour’s devolution projects in Scotland and 
Wales, and as such, they echoed the failed 1979 devolution referendums, also 
 
                                               
1 Two articles on the 1997 Scottish referendum, as well as two articles on the 1997 Welsh 
referendum, are mentioned in the bibliography at the end of this article. 
2 The main exception is the following book: Bridget TAYLOR & Katarina THOMSON 
(eds.), Scotland and Wales: Nations Again?, Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1999. 
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Table 1: Referendums in the UK 
 








(i) Do you want NI to remain part of the 
UK? or 
(ii) Do you want NI to be joined with 





UK Do you think that the UK should stay in 
the European Community (The 





Scotland Do you want the provisions of the 





Wales Do you want the provisions of the 






Scotland -Q1: (i) I agree that there should be a 
Scottish Parliament; or 
(ii) I do not agree that there should be a 
Scottish Parliament 
-Q2: (i) I agree that a Scottish 
Parliament should have tax-varying 
powers; or 
(ii) I do not agree that a Scottish 













Wales (i) I agree that there should be a Welsh 
Assembly; or 







Are you in favour of the Government’s 
proposals for a Greater London 
Authority, made up of an elected mayor 






Do you support the agreement reached 
at the multi-party talks on Northern 







Should there be an elected assembly for 
the North East region? 
22.1 77.9 
 
organised under a Labour government. That is why the announceme t on 27 June 
1996 that there would be new devolution referendums caused such furore in these 
nations, especially in Scotland where, most unusually, not o e but two questions 
were to be put to the electorate: one on the establishment of a Parliament and the 
other on the Parliament’s fiscal powers. Labour had previously said that an election 
victory would be enough to set up a Scottish Parliament and a Welsh Assembly, 
these policies being mentioned in their 1997 manifesto. Pro-dev lutionists therefore 
suspected that the need for referendums was a Labour ploy to ensure the failure of 
the devolution projects. Many of them were also livid at not having been consulted 
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and felt that the decision had been imposed on them by Tony Blair. In Scotland, two 
leading autonomists, namely Harry Ewing, the former co-chairman of the Scottish 
Constitutional Convention, and John McAllion, the shadow minister in charge of 
devolution, even resigned from their positions in protest. Ron Davies, the Welsh 
Secretary of State, was particularly embarrassed because he had explicitly ruled out 
the possibility of a referendum in the Western Mail, a Welsh morning paper, a few 
days before the annoucement. There was talk that it was in f ct George Robertson, 
the Shadow Scottish Secretary, who convinced Tony Blair of the need for a 
referendum in Scotland, for reasons that will be expounded later, and that if 
Scotland was to have a referendum, then Wales would have to have one too. What is 
likely is that the decision was made irrespective of the Welsh situation and without 
the knowledge of the Welsh Secretary and the Wales Labour Party. 
 
The pro-devolutionists’ anger was understandable: the failure of the 1979 
referendums had not only hastened Labour’s fall, inaugurating an eighteen-year-long 
era of Conservative rule, but it had also put devolution off the political agenda for a 
decade. Yet they need not have feared: the 1997 referendums were victories for the 
‘Yes’ camps in both Scotland and Wales. Why did nations who had rejected 
devolution in 1979 vote for it in 1997? By the time the second Scottish and Welsh 
referendums were organised, devolution had become a much ore consensual issue 
in both nations. Four reasons are generally given for this. First of all, eighteen years 
of Conservative rule and Thatcherite policies had convinced th  mainly Labour-
voting populations of Scotland and Wales that there was a ‘democratic deficit’ in 
Britain which only the creation of local assemblies could make good. Secondly, the 
1997 referendums, which took place in the aftermath of Labour’s landslide election, 
were held in a very different context from the 1979 referendums, which had been 
organised by the weak Callaghan government. This meant that the 1997 Labour 
government was not held to ransom by rebel Labour MPs as the 1979 Labour 
government had been. Thirdly, the pro-devolutionists were much more united the 
second time round, as a quick comparison between the 1979 and 1997 referendum 
campaigns will show. Finally, the 1979 referendums had beenpost-legislative and 
had concerned the precise devolution projects contained in the 1978 Scotland Act 
and the 1978 Wales Act. The questions put to the Scottish and Welsh people had 
been ‘Do you want the provisions of the Scotland Act to be put into effect?’ and ‘Do 
you want the provisions of the Wales Act 1978 to be put into effect?’ The 1997 
referendums were on the contrary pre-legislative and aimed at gathering the Scottish 
and Welsh people’s opinions on general principles. In 1997, the Welsh were asked 
whether they agreed or disagreed ‘that there should be a Welsh Assembly’. The 
Scottish people were similarly asked whether they agreed or disagreed ‘that there 
should be a Scottish Parliament’, and also whether they agreed or disagreed ‘that a 
Scottish Parliament should have tax-varying powers’.  
 
The projects on offer 
 
Although the Scottish and Welsh people were asked very general questions of 
principle, agreeing to these principles meant accepting precise devolution projects 
set out in two White Papers published in July 1997, which later became the basis for 
the Scotland Act 1998 and the Government of Wales Act 1998, but were themselves 
based on previously drafted proposals. Here the Scottish and Welsh cases differ. Not 
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only were the Scottish and Welsh devolution projects quite diff rent, despite the 
obvious fact that in both nations, the general aim was the creation of a national 
Assembly or Parliament, but they had also been drawn up i very different contexts. 
In the Scottish case, they had been carefully drafted by the widely representative, 
cross-party Scottish Constitutional Convention, whereas in the Welsh case they were 
the product of internal discussions within the Wales Labour Party. 
 
The Scottish Constitutional Convention met for the first time on 30 March 
1989 and published two reports, Towards Scotland’s Parliament in 1990 and 
Scotland’s Parliament, Scotland’s Right in 1995. It was jointly chaired by a Liberal 
Democrat (Sir David Steel, the former leader of the Scottish Liberal Democrats) and 
a Labour MP (Harry Ewing, a former minister). It was made up of a wide cross-
section of Scottish society. There were elected represntatives – MPs, MEPs and 
local councillors – and party delegates from two major parties, Labour and the 
Liberal Democrats, and five smaller parties or movements, mainly the Greens and 
the Communists. Other members represented Scotland’s civil society: its trade 
unions, churches, small businesses, women’s movements or ethnic minority 
communities. The SNP and the Conservatives, the two parties most opposed to 
devolution, were notably absent at the Convention, but the Convention’s second 
report claims that ‘many individuals from both these parties have supported [their]  
work publicly or privately’.3 The main points in the Convention’s reports and in the 
subsequent White Paper entitled Scotland’s Parliament were that there should be a 
Scottish Parliament, that it should be a single-chamber legislature made up of 129 
members (73 constituency representatives and 56 additional members chosen by 
proportional representation) with a fixed term of four years, nd that it should have 
wide legislative powers but very restricted tax powers. The Parliament would 
legislate in all areas for which the Scottish Secretary of State had been responsible 
and it would have the power to increase or cut the basic r te of income tax by up to 
3 pence in the pound. 
 
Labour’s plans for devolution to Wales, while similar to its plans for Scotland, 
were much less ambitious. Its White Paper on Wales, entitled A Voice for Wales, 
suggested that there should be a Welsh Assembly with 60 members (40 constituency 
representatives and 20 additional members chosen by proportional representation) 
with a fixed term of four years. The Assembly would take ovr the responsibilities 
of the Secretary of State for Wales concerning policies and public services in Wales, 
but these were less extensive than the Scottish Secretary’s. Moreover, the Assembly 
would only have secondary legislative powers, meaning powers over the ‘orders, 
rules and regulations which fill in the details of the framework set in Acts of 
Parliament’ voted at Westminster.4 Labour’s plans for Welsh devolution had already 
been outlined in two internal reports, Shaping the Vision and Preparing for a New 
Wales, respectively drafted for the May 1995 and the May 1996 Wales Labour Party 
Conferences. But calls by the Wales TUC (Trades Union Congress) for a 
Constitutional Convention on the Scottish model were reject d by the Wales Labour 
                                               
3 Scottish Constitutional Convention, Scotland’s Parliament, Scotland’s Right, Edinburgh: 
Scottish Constitutional Convention, 1995, p. 9. 
4 GREAT BRITAIN WELSH OFFICE, A Voice for Wales, Cm.3718, London: H.M.S.O., 
1997, p. 24. 
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Party and the Wales Parliamentary Labour group, for two reasons. A Convention 
would have meant bringing in Plaid Cymru, and a Convention would have raised the 
divisive issue of electoral reform. At the time of the Wales Labour Party’s first 
report on devolution, proportional representation had not been included in the 
blueprint. It was approved by the Party Executive in January 1997, after it became 
obvious that this was the only way to win round the other parties to the devolution 
project. From then on, the main differences between the Scottish and Welsh 
proposals were the extent of the legislative powers envisaged for each assembly and 
the Scottish Parliament’s planned fiscal powers. 
 
It was on the principles presented in the two July 1997 White Papers that the 
Scottish and the Welsh people were asked to vote on the days of the referendums. 
But why did the Welsh referendum contain one question only, on the general 
principle of devolution, while the Scottish referendum contained two, the Scottish 
public being asked to vote both on the principle of devolution and on a precise part 
of the devolution package, namely the Scottish Parliament’s fiscal powers? The 
answer has to do with realpolitik and with differences in the Scottish and Welsh 
political contexts. First of all, it seems that it was the Scottish Labour Party which 
insisted on settling the issue of the Parliament’s tax-varying powers by referendum 
as a compromise position between Tony Blair’s opposition to the Parliament having 
such powers and the position of the Scottish Constitutional Convention, which 
believed they were essential in order to give the Parliament greater independence 
from Westminster. Secondly, in Scotland, opponents to devolution had chosen to 
concentrate their attacks on the taxation powers. After Labour had agreed to the 
introduction of some element of proportional representation, the question of the 
Parliament’s fiscal powers had been the only part of the devolution package still 
open to controversy. Since 1995, when Michael Forsyth had become Secretary of 
State for Scotland, the Conservatives had warned that granting the Scottish 
Parliament such powers would lead to the creation of an extra ‘tartan tax’ for the 
Scottish public. This is the kind of allegation which New Labour, desperate to shed 
the party’s old ‘tax-and-spend’ image, could not afford to ignore. The Scottish 
Labour Party was therefore compelled by the London Party Executiv  to promise 
that if it became the majority party in the Scottish Parliament, it would not resort to 
the taxation powers for the duration of the first parliamentary session. Putting those 
powers to referendum was another way of undermining the Conservatives’ position 
as Labour could argue that the Scottish people were not being made to accept 
anything they had not agreed to. In Wales, where the devolution proposals were less 
extensive, there was no question of the Assembly having primary legislative powers, 
let alone fiscal powers. There was therefore no need to jeopardise the outcome of the 
referendum even more by asking the Welsh extra questions on specific aspects of 
the proposals. 
 
The referendum campaigns 
 
When the referendum campaigns began, the parties had learnt the lessons of 
the 1979 experience, especially on the ‘Yes’ side. In 1979, both ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ 
camps had been split, largely because of divisions within Labour, where vocal anti-
devolutionists had campaigned against party policy and where even the pro-
devolutionists had often lacked conviction and had refused to join forces with the 
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nationalist parties and the pro-devolutionary Conservative minority. As a result, in 
Wales, alongside the two umbrella campaigns (the ‘Wales for Assembly Campaign’ 
on the ‘Yes’ side and the Conservative-dominated ‘No Assembly Campaign’ on the 
‘No’ side), there had been a joint Labour-Wales TUC ‘Yes’ campaign and a ‘Labour 
No Assembly Campaign’, led by Labour backbenchers. Similarly, in Scotland, on 
the ‘Yes’ side, Labour had refused to run a joint campaign with the SNP and even a 
small ‘Conservative Yes Campaign’ had been established. On the ‘No’ side, 
although the Conservative Party had been the only party to campaign officially 
against the Assembly, a ‘Labour No Campaign’ had been launched alongside the 
campaign by ‘Scotland Says No’, a cross-party, Conservative-dominated body. After 
1979, the ‘Yes’ camp in particular had felt that its internal divisions had been one of 
the main reasons behind the failure of the referendums. In 1997, the pro-
devolutionists were therefore determined to run cross-party nd non-party 
campaigns.  
 
In Scotland, a neutral umbrella group campaigning for a double ‘Yes’ vote (to 
the first and second questions), which went under the name ‘Scotland Forward’, was 
set up immediately after the May 1997 general election. The campaign was chaired 
by Nigel Smith, a businessman who was not affiliated to any party. It was supported 
by many non-party members as well as members of the thre main Scottish parties, 
namely Labour, the Liberal Democrats and the SNP. Within Scottish Labour, left-
wingers and nationalists opposed to the second question — such as Scottish Labour 
Action, a devolutionist pressure group — were soon silenced by Blair loyalists. 
Although they were opposed to a referendum, the Scottish Liberal Democrats had no 
choice but to join the cross-party campaign, especially since their role within the 
Scottish Constitutional Convention had allowed them to contribute significantly to 
the devolution proposals. They were especially satisfied with two elements of the 
devolution scheme: proportional representation and the Parliament’s tax-varying 
powers. That the SNP should give its support was less obvious, as the Nationalists 
had withdrawn from the Scottish Constitutional Convention at a very early stage. 
There were some within the party who believed that their first aim should be to 
campaign for independence, not devolution, and that they had not gained anything 
from campaigning for devolution in 1979. Yet in August 1997, the party’s national 
council voted to join the ‘Yes/Yes’ campaign. The campaign was therefore backed 
by all the parties that represented Scotland at Westminster and by many high-profile 
figures such as Sean Connery. Scottish Labour leader Donald Dewar, Scottish 
Liberal Democrat leader Jim Wallace and SNP leader Alex Salmond were shown 
sharing platforms for the first time. The ‘Yes’ campaign turned on four 
quintessentially Labour themes: ‘that the referendum was a battle pitching Scotland 
against the Tories, that the Scottish parliament was essentially a new Labour 
government project to fulfil Tony Blair’s aim of modernising Britain, that there 
would be no tax rises and that the parliament would mean Scots taking decisions on 
Scottish issues in Scotland.’5 On the contrary, the Scottish ‘No’ campaign, known as 
‘Think Twice’ and launched in late June 1997, was lacklustre and weak. As the 
business community largely kept out of the campaign, the main backing for it came 
from the Conservatives, who had not returned a single Scottish MP at the general 
                                               
5 Peter JONES, ‘A Start to a New Song: the 1997 Devolution Referendum Campaign’, 
Scottish Affairs, vol. 21, 1997, p. 9. 
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election. The campaign was run by Lord Fraser, a former Scottish Office minister, 
but it could not boast the support of any celebrity personality. Moreover, the anti-
devolutionists were divided between ‘No/No’ supporters, ‘No/Yes’ supporters – 
people who were against a Parliament but thought that if there was to be one, then it 
should have fiscal powers – and even ‘Yes/No’ supporters, mainly businessmen who 
were in favour of a Scottish Parliament but were against paying higher taxes. The 
‘No’ campaign did not reap any benefits from Margaret Thatcher’s visit to Scotland 
two days before the referendum – quite the reverse, it seems: that day, the Daily 
Record, the leading Scottish tabloid, featured a picture of her on its front page, along 
with the words: ‘If you still need a reason to vote Yes: here’s one.’6 The other high-
profile intervention in favour of the ‘No’ camp came from Sir Bruce Patullo, 
governor of the Bank of Scotland. In an interview with The Scotsman, he said that 
the bank did not wish to comment on the desirability of a Scottish Parliament, but 
that it opposed the Parliament’s fiscal powers, which it believed would be bad for 
jobs and the health of the Scottish economy.7 The ‘No/No’ supporters knew that 
they were fighting a lost cause on the first question and that the only way of 
thwarting Labour’s devolution plans was to secure a majority of ‘No’ votes on the 
second question. Their campaign was thus focused on one issu : the cost of 
devolution. When all campaigning was suspended for a week just before the 
referendum out of respect for Lady Diana, who had died on 30 August 1997, some 
feared that this would be more detrimental to the ‘Yes’ camp than to the ‘No’ camp. 
There was some speculation that the emotion caused by her death would lead to an 
upsurge in feelings of Britishness and to the people rejecting any plan that could 
jeopardise the British Union. But the campaign for a Scottish Parliament had been 
going on for at least a decade and was not to be undone by an isolated event, tragic 
though it was. 
 
The Welsh situation was rather different. It was always far from obvious that 
the ‘Yes’ camp would win. There had been no high-profile, cross-party, nine-year-
long Constitutional Convention, meaning that none of the parties likely to call for a 
‘Yes’ vote had ever worked together and that the Welsh public was little aware of, 
or interested in, Labour’s devolution plans. Moreover, Labour still faced internal 
divisions over devolution to Wales. Many within the party were hostile, some of 
whom were prominent figures in local government, especially n Cardiff. The 
debates on the Referendum (Scotland and Wales) Bill had enabled Labour anti-
devolutionists to voice their opposition ahead of the referendum campaign. But in 
the context of Labour’s huge majority in the House of Commons, Labour dissidents 
held much less power than their 1979 predecessors. More importantly, the party 
generally appeared to be more committed to devolution to Wales than in 1979, as 
both the Wales Labour Party and (after 1 May 1997) the Labour g vernment 
campaigned for an Assembly, though there were tensions between the two. Labour 
also took part in the cross-party ‘Yes for Wales’ campaign which was officially 
launched in February 1997. The campaign included members of Welsh civil society, 
such as trade unionists and academics, alongside members of the Wales Labour 
Party, the Welsh Liberal Democrats and Plaid Cymru, the three Welsh parliamentary 
                                               
6 Quoted in Lindsay PATERSON, A Diverse Assembly. The Debate on a Scottish Parliament, 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998, p. 227. 
7 The Scotsman, 22 August 1997, mentioned in Peter JONES, op.cit., p. 11. 
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parties. This unity was largely the result of one man’s efforts. Ron Davies, who was 
Shadow Welsh Secretary at the beginning of the campaign and became Welsh 
Secretary after the May 1997 general election, had previously secured the backing of 
Plaid Cymru and the Welsh Liberal Democrats for Labour’s devolution plans by 
adding an element of proportional representation to the original Labour blueprint for 
an Assembly. Plaid Cymru, in particular, had at first been opposed to Labour’s 
planned referendum and had argued instead for a multi-choice ‘preferendum’ in 
which the people could choose to vote for independence. Like the SNP, it was 
deeply scarred by the 1979 referendum campaign, when it had done most of the 
work in support of Labour’s proposals. Therefore it only endorsed the new 
devolution proposals and agreed to take part in the cross-party campaign in mid-July 
1997, when it felt hat the Wales Labour Party’s commitment was secure enough. A 
lot of grassroots members also believed that devolution was better than the status 
quo and that the opportunity to influence the course of Welsh politics should not be 
missed. The Liberal Democrats had long been committed to home rule and there 
were no public divisions within the party over devolution. Unlike their Scottish 
counterparts, the Welsh Conservatives had never in their history supported any plan 
to establish an autonomous Assembly. They were therefore the backbone of the ‘Just 
Say No’ campaign, which existed alongside Labour dissenters’ personal ‘No’ 
campaigns. The ‘Just Say No’ campaign was officially launched on 21 July 1997, 
the day before the government published its White Paper on Wales. It was very low-
key, as the Welsh Conservatives were demoralised, having just been eliminated as a 
parliamentary force. The ‘No’ camp’s main arguments were based on voters’ fears: 
fears of increased costs and bureaucracy, fears of breaking the Union, and even non-
Welsh speakers’ fears regarding the place of the Welsh language. The ‘Yes for 
Wales’ campaign had a much higher profile and was focused on the general 
principles of devolution. Yet it is difficult to make generalisations about the ‘Yes’ 
campaign in Wales, as it was not nation-wide: on the contrary, there were locally 
based campaigns with different messages according to the area covered. Labour 
concentrated its efforts on convincing voters in its traditional heartlands, namely the 
mining valleys and industrial centres of South Wales, whereas in parts of North 
Wales for example, Plaid Cymru members worked for the ‘Yes’ campaign.  
 
The Scottish and Welsh referendum campaigns had quite a lo  in common. The 
Scottish ‘Yes’ camp included both members of Scotland’s civil society and 
members of the three main Scottish parties; the campaign was high-profile and 
widely covered by the national media. The ‘No’ camp was weak and divided, and its 
only real support came from a party which had just been wiped out at the general 
election. In Wales, the ‘Yes’ camp was also widely representative and included the 
three Welsh parliamentary parties, while the ‘No’ camp was mainly restricted to the 
Conservatives, though there were more Labour dissenters than in Scotland. Yet the 
Scottish and Welsh campaigns did not revolve around the same issues: the Scottish 
one was essentially centred on the question of tax rises, whereas the Welsh one 
raised more general questions to do with the principle of devolution. But the main 
difference between the two campaigns lies in the extent of press coverage of, and 
support for, the ‘Yes’ sides. Press coverage of the Scottish ‘Yes’ campaign was very 
wide because of the many celebrities involved, and more importantly, because the 
campaign had the support of all the Scottish dailies, evenright-wing papers such as 
The Daily Express; the only exception was the Daily Mail. This was a great asset for 
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the ‘Yes’ side, as the vast majority of Scottish people read Scottish dailies or 
Scottish editions of British dailies. In Wales, most peopl  read British newspapers, 
which are unlikely to cover Welsh events extensively. This proved true during the 
referendum campaigns. So although the two Welsh morning papers, the Cardiff-
based Western Mail and the Liverpool-based Daily Post, advocated a ‘Yes’ vote, the 
public was less aware of the ‘Yes’ arguments than in Scotland. 
 
The referendum results 
 
Table 2: Results of the 1979 and 1997 devolution referendums, Scotland and Wales 























% Turnout 63.6 60.4 60.4 58.8 50.1 
 





% Yes Q1 
1997 
% Yes Q2 
Borders 40,3 62,8 50,7 
Central 54,7 76,3 65,9 
Dumfries & 
Galloway 
40,3 60,7 48,8 
Fife 53,7 76,1 64,7 
Grampian 48,3 67,6 55,6 
Highland 51,0 72,6 62,1 
Lothians 50,1 74,5 63,7 
Orkney 17,9 57,3 47,4 
Shetland 27,1 62,4 51,6 
Strathclyde 54,0 78,1 67,7 
Tayside 49,5 67,6 57,0 
Western Isles 55,8 79,4 68,4 
SCOTLAND 51,6 74,3 63,5 
 
Regardless of the differences in the referendum campaigns, n the end, both 
Scotland and Wales voted for devolution. But here again it would be misleading to 
lump the two nations together: the scale of the ‘Yes’ victory makes the Scottish 
results very different from the Welsh ones. While the devolution plans were agreed 
to by a resounding majority of the Scottish people, they onl got the backing of the 
slightest of majorities in Wales.  
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Clwyd 21.6 41.2 
Dyfed 28.1 57.1 
Gwent 12.1 42.5 
Gwynedd 34.4 52.9 
Mid Glamorgan 20.2 56.4 
Powys 18.4 42.7 
South Glamorgan 13.1 41.8 
West Glamorgan 18.7 57.7 
WALES 20.3 50.3 
 
As tables 2 and 3 reveal, in Scotland, on a turnout of 60.4%, three-quarters of 
the people voted in favour of a Scottish Parliament and almost two-thirds voted in 
favour of it having tax-varying powers. The majority was more restricted on the 
second question than on the first; yet it was higher than most had predicted, since the 
taxation powers had been interpreted as powers to raise taxes, not to lower them. 
The Conservatives had also focused their attacks on this aspect of the devolution 
package, which they had felt to be its weakest. Moreover, all 12 regions (and all 32 
local government areas) supported the creation of a Scottish Parliament and only 
two regions, Orkney and Dumfries & Galloway, voted ‘No’ to the second question. 
 
A comparison between those results and the 1979 results shows to what extent 
support for devolution had increased in 18 years. In 1997, 74.3% of Scottish voters 
wanted a Scottish Parliament to be established; this was 22.7% more voters than in 
1979, when 51.6% of them had agreed to the creation of a Scottish Assembly. 
Consensus over devolution had also spread throughout Scotland. In 1979, only half 
the regions (6 out of 12) had voted in favour of a Scottish Assembly, with as little as 
27.1% of the people in Shetland and 17.9% of the people in Orkney voting ‘Yes’; 
the best ‘Yes’ results had been 55.8%, obtained in the Western Isles. By contrast, in 
1997, even Orkney and Shetland agreed to the establishment of a Scottish 
Parliament. The lowest regional ‘Yes’ vote on the first question was 57.3% (in 
Orkney again) and the highest was 79.4% (in the Western Isles again). 
 
There had only been one question in the 1979 referendum, so that the 1997 
results on the second question can be compared to no other.Nevertheless, it is 
remarkable that even in the two regions which voted against the tax powers in 1997, 
there was not a decisive majority of ‘Noes’: 47.4% of the people in Orkney and 48.8% 
of the people in Dumfries & Galloway still voted ‘Yes’. As for turnout, it was lower in 
1997 than in 1979 (60.4% compared with 63.6%), but some in the ‘Yes’ camp believe 
that the real turnout was closer to 71%, as the electoral register was 11 months out of 
date, 6 months more than the 1979 register, so that an estimat d 15% of the people on 
the electoral roll had died or moved at the time of the ref rendum.8 More importantly, 
the turnout and the ‘Yes’ margin were enough for 44.7% of the electorate to vote for a 
                                               
8 Peter JONES, op. cit., p. 2. 
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Scottish Parliament. In 1979, an amendment to the Scotland Act 1978, called the 
Cunningham amendment, had ensured that a Scottish Assembly would only be set up 
if not only more than 50% of the voters, but also more than 40% of the total electorate 
agreed to it in the forthcoming referendum. So even though more than half the Scottish 
voters (51.6%) had voted ‘Yes’, this had only represented 32.8% of the electorate and 
the devolution plans had been abandoned. In 1997, a simple majority of those voting 
had been the majority required, as promised in the 1997 Labour manifesto,9 but it was 
quite heartening for the ‘Yes’ camp to know that more than 40% of the electorate had 
voted in favour of a Scottish Parliament anyway. In Scotland, the 1997 referendum 
confirmed that a national Parliament was indeed the ‘settled will of the Scottish 
people’, in John Smith’s famous phrase. 
 
By contrast, in Wales, the results seem to suggest a country deeply divided on 
the issue of devolution. Out of a turnout of only half the population (50.1% of the 
electorate), only half the Welsh voters (50.3%) came out in favour of a Welsh 
Assembly. In fact there was a ‘Yes’ majority of less than 7,000 votes out of a 
million votes cast (559,419 people voted ‘Yes’ and 552,698 people voted ‘No’). 
This corresponded to as little as 0.6% of the votes and 0.3% of the electorate. 
Moreover, only half the councils (4 out of 8, as table 4 shows) and half the local 
authority areas (11 out of 22) agreed to the creation of a Welsh Assembly. 
 
These results, though much less decisive for the ‘Yes’ camp than in Scotland, 
were still a considerable improvement on the 1979 results and revealed a greater 
swing towards devolution than in Scotland. In 1997, 30% more of the Welsh 
electorate voted ‘Yes’ than had voted ‘Yes’ in 1979, as opposed to 22.7% more of 
the Scottish electorate (on the first question). So why ere the overall results so 
close in Wales? The geography of the vote seems to confirm that there is an East-
West divide in Wales. All of the Western districts voted ‘Yes’ apart from the most 
Western of them all, Pembrokeshire, whereas all of the districts bordering England 
voted ‘No’. The city of Swansea voted ‘Yes’, but the city of Cardiff – which now 
hosts the Welsh Assembly – voted ‘No’. These geographical divisions echo both 
socio-economic divisions, and cultural and linguistic division . The mainly English-
speaking, more affluent parts of Wales, namely the Eastern coastal areas and the 
borderlands, voted ‘No’, while the industrial areas and mining valleys of the South, 
and the Welsh-speaking heartland of the North and West, voted ‘Yes’. Table 5 
shows that there was a significant relationship between voting ‘Yes’ and being able 
to speak Welsh. 
 
Table 5: 1997 Welsh referendum: Language spoken and referendum vote 
 
Language Yes (%) No (%) 
Fluent Welsh 77 23 
Non-fluent Welsh 48 52 
No Welsh 42 58 
 
Source: J. Barry JONES & Denis BALSOM, The Road to the National Assembly for Wales, 
Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2000, p.171. 
                                               
9 LABOUR PARTY, Because Britain Deserves Better, London: Labour Party, 1997, p. 33. 
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A huge majority of fluent Welsh speakers voted ‘Yes’, whereas a majority of 
non-fluent Welsh speakers and of non-Welsh speakers voted ‘No’. There was also a 
clear relationship between feelings of national identity and voting behaviour, but this 
was less true in Wales than in Scotland. Table 6 is based on the results of the 1997 
Scottish and Welsh Referendum Studies, carried out in Scotland and Wales at the 
time of the referendums. People were asked whether they felt exclusively Scottish or 
Welsh, more Scottish / Welsh than British, equally Scottish / Welsh and British, or 
exclusively British; they were then asked how they had voted in the referendum. 
 
Table 6: 1997 Scottish and Welsh referendums: Nation l identity and referendum vote 
 
 Wales Scotland 


















Welsh/Scottish, not British 43 23 34 67 6 27 
More Welsh/Scottish than 
British 
44 25 32 60 11 29 
Equally Welsh/Scottish and 
British 
26 34 41 44 33 23 
More British than 
Welsh/Scottish 
16 37 47 41 34 26 
British, not Welsh/Scottish 13 45 42 25 49 27 
 
Source: Bridget TAYLOR & Katarina THOMSON (eds.), Scotland and Wales: Nations 
Again?, Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1999, p.129. 
 
In Wales, people who felt strongly Welsh (either just Welsh, or m re Welsh 
than British) were those most likely to have voted ‘Yes’ in the referendum; they 
were also those least likely to have voted ‘No’. Those two categories voted ‘Yes’ in 
almost equal numbers (43% for the first category and 44% for the second). The less 
Welsh the people felt, the less likely they were to have voted ‘Yes’: more people 
who felt equally Welsh and British voted ‘Yes’ than people who felt more British 
than Welsh, and more people in this category voted ‘Yes’ than people who felt 
exclusively British. 
 
Conversely, the weaker the respondents’ feelings of Welsh identity, the more 
they were likely to have voted ‘No’. The people who felt just Welsh were three 
times more likely to have been ‘Yes’ voters than the people who felt just British. 
Finally, there was a relationship between feelings of national identity and turnout: 
the people who felt strongly Welsh had lower levels of abstention than those who 
felt strongly British or who felt equally British and Welsh. But feeling Welsh was 
clearly not enough to guarantee a ‘Yes’ vote: even amongst the most strongly Welsh 
group, only 43-44% voted ‘Yes’ and up to 25% voted ‘No’; one third did not vote at 
all.  
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In Scotland, there was also a clear relationship between national identity and 
vote. As in Wales, the more Scottish people felt, the more likely they were to have 
voted ‘Yes’ and the less Scottish they felt, the more likely they were to have voted 
‘No’. What was different in the Scottish case was that there was no correlation 
between national identity and turnout: those who felt exclusively Scottish were just 
as likely to have voted than those who felt exclusively British. But the main 
difference was in the extent to which the strongly Scottish group voted ‘Yes’, 
compared with the equivalent group in Wales: 67% of those who felt just Scottish 
voted ‘Yes’, compared with 43% in Wales, and 60% of those who described 
themselves as more Scottish than British voted ‘Yes’, compared with 44% in Wales. 
Only 6% of those who felt just Scottish, and 11% of those who felt more Scottish 
than British, voted ‘No’, compared with 23% and 25% in Wales. So the more 
strongly Scottish group was markedly more in favour of devolution han the 
corresponding group in Wales. A comparison between the Welsh ca e and the 
Scottish case shows that the national identity variable is undoubtedly useful to 
explain differences in voting behaviour, but that it applies b tter to the Scottish 




Since the birth of the Scottish and Welsh home rule move ents at the turn of 
the 19th and 20th centuries, the constitutional destinies of the two natio s have been 
linked. Home Rule Bills and official reports on devolution have often concerned 
both Scotland and Wales. The first two referendums on the establishment of Scottish 
and Welsh Assemblies were held the same day. Therefor  it was not surprising that 
the decision to hold a new referendum in Scotland in 1997 led to another referendum 
being held in Wales. Yet the parallelism between the two nations must not obscure 
the marked differences between them, which the referendum campaigns and results 
highlighted. First of all, it is important to note that the movement for constitutional 
reform was initiated by Scotland, not Wales. In Wales, the debate on devolution was 
mainly restricted to Labour ranks, and the movement for devolution in the Labour 
Party was largely driven not by a desire for a Welsh Assembly, but by the Scottish 
Constitutional Convention. This explains why the devolution proposals were more 
extensive, and why the public was better informed about them, in Scotland than in 
Wales. This in turn explains why there was a one-question referendum in Wales and 
a two-question referendum in Scotland, and why the campaigns took place in very 
different contexts. In Scotland, the ‘No’ camp focused on the second question, as it 
knew it would not win on the first, whereas in Wales, it developed more general 
themes because it had every chance of winning. Different d volution schemes and 
different referendum campaigns gave different results. The Scottish people 
demanded a Parliament, while the Welsh only gave the Assmbly grudging support. 
But in both Scotland and Wales the pro-devolutionists hailed the referendums as 
landmarks in the histories of their nations, as they represented the first concrete steps 
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